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Four Questions on Fiduciaries
Sarah Worthington*
This article explores four pressing analytical challenges in fiduciary law. The problems 
are exposed by seeking answers to the pointed “who, what, and so what?” questions on 
fiduciaries. In short, “Who is a fiduciary?” and just how far does this protective jurisdiction 
stretch. Secondly, “What distinctive obligations rest on a fiduciary’s shoulders?” — what 
is it that defines and sets apart the fiduciary regime, providing it with mechanisms 
which differ from the routine restrictions applying to anyone who acts for others? And, 
finally, “What particular and distinguishing consequences follow upon a breach of these 
special restrictions?” This last question breaks down into two familiar but seemingly 
intractable parts: when and how do profits need to be disgorged; and when and how do 
losses need to be compensated? The answers to these four questions have never proved 
easy, yet these are the questions we must answer. Here it is suggested that a tightly 
rationalised (and, as it turns out, rather narrow) answer to the first question leads 
inescapably to more readily defensible answers to the three questions which follow it. 
* Downing Professor of the Laws of England and Fellow of Trinity College, 
Cambridge.
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I. Introduction
Some areas of equity seem to have presented practical and analytical challenges almost from their inception. Fiduciary law is just such an 
area. Given its importance in regulating commercial and domestic life, 
this is a problem. A more settled landscape might have been expected, 
especially after 50 years of sustained legal analysis by commentators1 and 
longer still by judges. That makes its examination ideally suited to the 
broad but challenging theme of this special issue of the Canadian Journal 
of Comparative and Contemporary Law, with its focus on “Equity in the 
21st Century: Problems and Perspectives”.
In this article I examine the most pressing and persistent challenges 
in fiduciary law by exposing four questions which seem to have remained 
the most intractable throughout the development of this area. Instead 
of adopting the usual journalistic “who, what, when, where, why?” of 
fiduciaries, I have gone for the rather shorter “who, what, so what?” 
1. Effectively beginning with Leonard Sedgwick Sealy, “Fiduciary 
Relationships” (1962) 20:1 Cambridge Law Journal 69 [Sealy, “Fiduciary 
Relationships”]; Leonard Sedgwick Sealy, “Some Principles of Fiduciary 
Obligation” (1963) 21:1 Cambridge Law Journal 119; and Leonard 
Sedgwick Sealy, “Director as Trustee” (1967) 25:1 Cambridge Law 
Journal 83. The earlier work by Austin Scott, by contrast, assumed 
the category and focused on the consequences: Austin W Scott, “The 
Fiduciary Principle” (1949) 37:4 California Law Review 539 [Scott, “The 
Fiduciary Principle”].
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series of questions: who are we talking about? What activities are being 
scrutinised? And — so what? — meaning, so what consequences follow? 
“So what?” is undoubtedly the most important question for lawyers, and 
especially for common lawyers.2 It is the question about remedies, and 
provides the final two of my four intractable questions on fiduciaries. We 
only really understand our rights and obligations, and by implication 
who should be the subject of them, if we understand the remedies. In 
short, “so what?” often tells us quite a lot about “what” and “who?” 
For the most part I have tried to address these issues without delving 
into the detail of specific cases. But, perhaps predictably, two controversial 
cases on fiduciary remedies are in my sightlines, one on disgorgement, 
and one on equitable compensation. Both have emerged from the UK 
Supreme Court. They are selected because they illustrate especially clearly 
the issues being addressed in all common law jurisdictions, and provide 
telling vehicles for exposing the problems. The first is FHR European 
Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC 3 (“FHR”), on disgorgement 
of profits made by a disloyal fiduciary agent taking bribes (or secret 
commissions, an expression less suggestive of moral turpitude); the 
second is AIB Group (UK) v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors4 (“Redler”), 
on equitable compensation for losses caused when solicitors made 
unauthorised payments out of their client account. 
But the arguments which underpin this article extend well beyond 
fiduciary law; they embrace the equitable jurisdiction in its entirety.
My larger agenda is that we should stop investing equity with mystique 
and mystery. Most equitable rules do not need a special language, or a 
special thought process, or a special philosophy, for their explanation 
or justification.5 More than that, we should be able to explain all these 
2. This is because common law rights are defined by the remedies the courts 
will award for their protection.
3. [2014] UKSC 45 [FHR].
4. [2014] UKSC 58 [Redler].
5. Contrast Peter Millett, “The Common Lawyer and the Equity 
Practitioner” (2015) 6 UK Supreme Court Yearbook 193 (“[e]quity is 
not a set of rules but a state of mind” at 193) [Millett, “The Common 
Lawyer”]. 
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rules, and their context, and why they are appropriate, in legal language 
which makes plain the demarcation between situations where the general 
(typically common law) rule suffices, and those where some “special” 
(typically equitable) rule is warranted.6 The rules may concern legal 
rights, or obligations, or remedies, or defences. It matters little. Sadly, 
given the historical baggage and the disinclination to cut free from it, 
this can probably only be done by the highest courts in each jurisdiction. 
Only these courts can now give the sort of explanation that cuts through 
established language and defines principle, doctrine and policy so as to 
settle, and settle properly, the law in these difficult areas. And by “settle 
properly” I mean provide judgments which command respect for the 
force of their reasoning, not merely the weight of their authority. 
At least in my two cases on fiduciary remedies, the UK Supreme 
Court has set out well, exceptionally well in some respects, but (for 
different reasons in each case) has in the end avoided closing the loop on 
these difficult issues. I know in saying this I am conforming to academic 
caricature. During the hearing of Redler, Lord Neuberger apparently 
commented that one thing was certain: whatever the court decided, 
the decision would be criticised.7 But I hope this commentary is also 
appropriately complimentary.
Putting the law on a secure footing is important. Until that is done, 
debates will persist. These debates create turbulence, destabilising judicial 
assertions of principle, policy, process, technique and language. They 
also provide impetus for counsel and courts to seek out exceptions and 
distinctions and qualifications which, with a more robust rule, perhaps 
6. This was the overarching message in Sarah Worthington, Equity, 2d 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) [Worthington, Equity]. As I said 
in the Preface to the first edition, “[a] distinctive equity jurisdiction keeps 
its resolutions isolated, segregated in a box labelled ‘solutions to hard 
cases’”. No wonder equity earned a reputation as “hard law”.
7. Simon Hale, “AIB v Mark Redler”, Case Comment, online: The 
Professional Negligence Bar Association <http://pnba.co.uk/aib-group-
uk-v-mark-redler-co-solicitors/> (“[l]eading Counsel for AIB, Nicholas 
Davidson QC, reports that Lord Neuberger wryly observed during 
argument that ‘only one thing was certain. Whatever we decide, it will be 
criticised” in the final paragraph of the case note [emphasis in original]). 
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would not or should not have been sustainable. This is a process that 
does little for any national or international rule of law and the ambition 
to treat like cases alike. 
In summary, the goal in this article is to expose something of what 
does make the fiduciary jurisdiction special, and what troubling questions 
most need to be answered if the jurisdiction is to serve the needs of the 
21st century.
II. Who?: Who is a Fiduciary?
This question is not easy. It might seem otherwise, since it is impossible to 
obtain a law degree, or practise as a lawyer, without finding out something 
about these people called fiduciaries. We all know that certain individuals 
— typically catalogued as trustees, company directors, partners, agents, 
solicitors, and such like — are within the catchment. 
Yet, despite the millions of words devoted to the issue,8 it seems 
impossible to define a fiduciary in a way which includes all these well-
recognised fiduciary types, yet excludes others in whom we might 
legitimately repose trust and confidence without attracting this added 
8. The literature is vast. For a summary of the principal views advanced, see 
e.g. Ernest J Weinrib, “The Fiduciary Obligation” (1975) 25:1 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 1; JC Shepherd, “Towards a Unified Concept 
of Fiduciary Relationships” (1981) 97:1 Law Quarterly Review 51; D 
Gordon Smith, “The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty” (2002) 
55:5 Vanderbilt Law Review 1399; Lionel Smith, “The Motive, Not the 
Deed” in Joshua Getzler, ed, Rationalizing Property, Equity and Trusts: 
Essays in Honour of Edward Burn (London: LexisNexis, 2003) ch 4; and 
Paul B Miller, “The Fiduciary Relationship” in Andrew S Gold & Paul B 
Miller, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Fiduciary Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) [Miller, “The Fiduciary Relationship”]. And 
contrast Finn’s approach in his classic monograph, dealing with all the 
different types of “obligations” the courts have described as “fiduciary”: 
Paul Desmond Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (Sydney: Law Book Co, 1977) 
[Finn, Fiduciary Obligations]. 
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baggage.9 My solicitor is a fiduciary,10 but not my plumber, even though 
I may be equally at the mercy of both, invest both with discretions to 
exercise on my account, and be compelled to trust both with decisions 
which affect my welfare and my finances.11 Similarly, my business partner 
is a fiduciary, but not the project manager on my building site; the 
director of my company is a fiduciary,12 but not my co-shareholders or 
9. Peter Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce” (1998) 114:2 Law 
Quarterly Review 214 [Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce”] 
(noting that the task “continues without evident sign of success” at 
219). Also see Robert P Austin, “Commerce and Equity: Fiduciary Duty 
and Constructive Trust” (1986) 6:3 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
444 at 445; Dennis R Klinck, “The Rise of the ‘Remedial’ Fiduciary 
Relationship”, Case Comment on International Corona Resources Ltd v Lac 
Minerals Ltd, (1988) 33:3 McGill Law Journal 600 at 603.
10. Although see the comments later.
11. Paul Desmond Finn, “Fiduciary Reflections” (2014) 88:2 Australian 
Law Journal 127 at 137 [Finn, “Fiduciary Reflections”]; also see Paul 
Desmond Finn, “The Fiduciary Principle” in Timothy G Youdan, ed, 
Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Toronto: Carswell 1989), ch 1 at 46 [Finn, 
“The Fiduciary Principle”]; and Paul Desmond Finn, “Contract and the 
Fiduciary Principle” (1989) 12:1 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 76. See too Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2), [2012] 
FCAFC 6 (Austl) at para 177 [Grimaldi]. 
12. But even then, note that the duties are owed to the company, not to the 
company’s shareholders, despite their vulnerability: Percival v Wright, 
[1902] 2 Ch 421 (Eng); Peskin v Anderson, [2001] 1 BCLC 372 (CA 
(Civ)(Eng)) at paras 29-30, per Mummery LJ; Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) 
Ltd, [1992] BCLC 192 (Ch (Eng)) at 208 obiter, per Nicolas Browne-
Wilkinson VC; Sharp v Blank, [2015] EWHC 3220 (Ch) at paras 12-13, 
per Nugee J [Sharp]. Of course, a fiduciary relationship explicitly between 
director and shareholder could arise on the specific facts, if warranted: 
Allen v Hyatt (1914), 30 TLR 444 (PC (Judiical Committee)); Coleman v 
Myers, [1977] 2 NZLR 225 (CA).
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co-bondholders.13 This is despite the fact that all can profoundly affect 
my interests.14
This matters, because rather dramatic obligational and remedial 
advantages come with the fiduciary label. My solicitor is amenable to 
such claims; my plumber is not. The territory is fought over precisely 
because of the attractive idea that fiduciaries must conduct themselves 
“at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd”,15 and the remedies for 
breach are perceived to be better. 
In England we have not troubled ourselves much by these boundaries. 
As Lord Millett put it, writing extra-judicially, “as usual, we [the English] 
have tried to muddle through without attempting a definition, believing 
that anyone can recognize a fiduciary when he sees one”.16
But it is far from clear that we can. We understand the consequences 
clearly enough, but not when to expect them. Absent a fiduciary 
relationship, the basic premise of party dealings is assumed to be “buyer 
beware”, with each party looking to its own interests.17 Within a fiduciary 
relationship, however, the fiduciary is expected to be “on the other party’s 
13. Although there will be constraints on the exercise of power by both. For 
shareholders, see Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd, [1900] 1 Ch 656 
(CA (Eng)) at 671, per Lord Lindley MR; Peter’s American Delicacy Co 
Ltd v Heath (1939), 61 CLR 457 (HCA) at 504, per Dixon J. In the US 
the assertion is subject to special treatment of shareholders in closely held 
corporations in some states. For bondholders, see Redwood Master Fund 
Ltd v TD Bank Europe Ltd, [2002] EWHC 2703 (Ch) at paras 105-106, 
per Rimer J; Azevedo v Imcopa Importação, Exportação E Indústria De Olėos 
Ltda, [2013] EWCA Civ 364; Assénagon Asset Management SA v Irish 
Bank Resolution Corp Ltd (formerly Anglo Irish Bank Corp Ltd), [2012] 
EWHC 2090 (Ch).
14. Indeed, the scale of the discretion or the likely harm is not determinative: 
both fiduciaries and non-fiduciaries cover a broad spectrum. On 
fiduciaries, see the classic statement in Re Coomber, [1911] 1 Ch 723 (CA 
(Eng)) at 728-29, per Fletcher Moulton LJ.
15. Meinhard v Salmon, 164 NE 545 at 546 (NY App Ct 1928).
16. Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce”, supra note 9 (adding 
that “[r]ecent experience shows this to be optimistic” at 218, n 11).
17. Although even that is modified by a good number of common law, 
equitable and statutory rules.
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side” — loyalty is claimed. When is the line crossed? 
The line is not crossed simply because we have handed over some part 
of our autonomy to another,18 or (saying much the same thing) invested 
another with powers and discretions which must be exerted in the 
interests of the principal and not the fiduciary power-holder.19 Of course, 
exactly this fiduciary limitation on power is true if the power-holder is 
a fiduciary. But not all power-holders are fiduciaries. And constraints 
on the exercise of power do not depend on fiduciary status; all power-
holders are equally constrained.20 What the fiduciary context adds, if it 
applies, is that the purpose of the exercise of the powers is unequivocally 
to advance the principal’s interests, and any considerations which call 
into play the fiduciary’s interests are either “irrelevant considerations” or 
reflect “improper purposes”. The same easy assertion is not possible with 
other power-holders, such as shareholders, or bondholders, or ordinary 
contracting parties, even though these are all people to whom we might 
delegate powers or in whom we might vest part of our decision-making 
autonomy.
Just last year the UK Law Commission suggested that “[t]he key 
test [for a fiduciary] is whether there is a legitimate expectation that one 
18. Lionel Smith, “Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of 
Judgement on Behalf of Another” (2014) 130:4 Law Quarterly Review 
608.
19. This is an increasingly common view, perhaps intuitively seeking out the 
circumstances when a fiduciary relationship might be needed. The clearest 
exponent of the “powers” view is Miller, “The Fiduciary Relationship”, 
supra note 8; and Paul B Miller, “Justifying Fiduciary Duties” (2013) 58:4 
McGill Law Journal 969. 
20. Vatcher v Paull, [1915] AC 372 (HL) at 378, per Lord Parker; Equitable 
Life Assurance Society v Hyman, [2002] 1 AC 408 (HL) at 451-62. Also 
see the references at note 13, above. 
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party will act in another’s interest”.21 But this repeats the question rather 
than delivering the answer: when is there a legitimate expectation that 
one party will act in another’s interest? There are many instances where 
one party has an expectation, perhaps even a well-founded expectation, 
that the other will act in their interests.22 But the real question is whether 
the law will insist that this expectation, and indeed perhaps even more 
than this expectation, is delivered. This is rarer than we might think. 
The hurdle might seem to be overcome by suggesting that the fiduciary 
rule applies only when there is an “undertaking” by one party to perform 
21. UK Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries 
(Law Commission No 350)(1 July 2014), online: UK Law Commission 
<http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc350_fiduciary_duties.
pdf>, discussing the definition of a fiduciary generally at 3.16-3.24, 
and finally settling on the cited definition at 3.24 [emphasis added], 
adding that discretion, power to act and vulnerability are all indicators 
of such an expectation. See the references cited there, especially Arklow 
Investments Ltd v Maclean, [2000] 1 WLR 594 (PC (NZ)) at 598; and 
James Edelman, “When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?” (2010) 126:2 Law 
Quarterly Review 302 [Edelman, “When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?”]. 
See also Finn, “Fiduciary Reflections”, supra note 11.
22. See for example, JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell Navigation 
Corporation, [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm)(Gloster J rejecting 
Springwell’s contention that, although the relationship of investment 
advisor and client was not one of the categories of relationship where 
a fiduciary relationship would simply be presumed by the law, such a 
relationship arose on the facts. She observed: “[b]ut the mere fact that one 
party to a commercial relationship ‘trusts’ the other does not predicate a 
fiduciary relationship. The word ‘trust’, like the word ‘advice’ has a variety 
of meanings. … Springwell no doubt ‘trusted’ Chase to conduct itself in a 
commercially appropriate manner. But I do not consider that Springwell 
had any legitimate expectation that, in its commercial dealings with 
Springwell, Chase would subordinate its interests to those of Springwell” 
at para 574). See also Barclays Bank v Svizera Holdings BV, [2014] EWHC 
1020 (Comm) at para 8; Bailey v Barclays Bank, [2014] EWHC 2882 
(QB) at paras 89-90 (appeal outstanding).
732 
 
Worthington, Four Questions on Fiduciaries
in this way,23 but in all the recognised fiduciary contexts we want the 
fiduciary requirement enforced regardless: we do not want trustees or 
company directors to be able to escape the fiduciary regime simply by 
denying an undertaking to comply with it.24 
Despite all the effort, therefore, we still lack a compelling way 
of describing, never mind rationalizing, the imposition of fiduciary 
rules.25 These rules impose heavy constraints on the fiduciary’s personal 
autonomy, and should be imposed only when nothing else will do the 
23. For suggestions that an “undertaking” is important, see Hospital Products 
Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984), 156 CLR 41 (HCA) at 
paras 96-97, per Mason J [Hospital Products Ltd]; Bristol and West Building 
Society v Mothew, [1998] Ch 1 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) [Bristol]; Scott, “The 
Fiduciary Principle”, supra note 1; Sealy, “Fiduciary Relationships”, supra 
note 1; Edelman, “When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?”, supra note 21 at 
317-318.
24. Although contrast the findings in other circumstances: see Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia 
Pty Limited (ACN 113 114 832)(No. 4), [2007] FCA 963 (Austl) at paras  
276-81, per Jacobson J (finding that an exclusion clause was effective 
(the clause providing that Citigroup was engaged “[a]s an independent 
contractor and not in any other capacity including as a fiduciary” at 
para 145). This conclusion was roundly criticised in Finn, “Fiduciary 
Reflections”, supra note 11 at 140ff. Note that purported exclusion of 
the fiduciary duty entirely is quite different from the permissible express 
curtailment of its scope, see for example, New Zealand Netherlands Society 
Oranje Inc v Kuys, [1973] 2 All ER 1222 (PC (NZ)) [Kuys]; Hospital 
Products Ltd, supra note 23 at paras 97, 102; Kelly v Cooper, [1993] AC 
205 (PC (Bermuda)) at 213-215, (or the whitewash provided by the 
fiduciary giving advance notice of, and obtaining the principal’s agreement 
to, the pursuit of conflicting opportunities).
25. There is debate over whether these duties are “imposed” or “undertaken”. 
While I agree a person will not be a fiduciary if ignorant of any 
circumstances which ought to affect her behaviour (as with ignorant 
recipients of trust property or of mistaken payments), I otherwise favour 
the view that these duties are imposed by the law in a limited range of 
circumstances. See Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, 
[1996] AC 669 (HL); Finn, “The Fiduciary Principle”, supra note 11.
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job.26 But when is that? 
In seeking answers, I suggest that our language is impeding our analysis. 
In particular, the search for a category of person is doomed to failure. For 
good reason the law typically seeks to define categories of  obligations, 
duties and remedies, not categories of people. It may look to relationships, 
but generally only to explain the context in which particular obligations 
and duties are owed. By contrast, the search for categories of people who 
will be obliged to “act in another’s interest” makes us forget that there 
are very many categories of obligations which might deliver these ends. 
Even a short list would include: contractual regimes, tort rules, duties 
of confidence, duties to provide full information,27 the undue influence 
and fair-dealing rules,28 and duties controlling the exercise of powers. 
But the people who owe some — or even all — of these duties are not 
necessarily fiduciaries. Equally, even though people who are fiduciaries 
are likely to owe all these duties, it is not this which attracts the fiduciary 
26. Worthington, Equity, supra note 6 at 127ff; and Sarah Worthington, 
“Fiduciaries: When is Self-Denial Obligatory?” (1999) 58:3 Cambridge 
Law Journal 500 [Worthington, “Fiduciaries: When is Self-Denial 
Obligatory?”]. Also see Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce”, 
supra note 9 at 217-218.
27. Sharp, supra note 12.
28. Despite some suggestions that the fair-dealing rule is merely an 
application of the fiduciary no-conflict rule: see e.g. Re Thompson’s 
Settlement, [1986] Ch 99 (Eng) at 115, per Vinelott J; and Matthew 
Conaglen, “A Re-Appraisal of the Fiduciary Self-Dealing and Fair-Dealing 
Rules” (2006) 65:2 Cambridge Law Journal 366. For the argument 
that they are distinct, see Tito v Waddell (No 2), [1977] Ch 106 (Eng) 
at 241, per Megarry VC; and Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 8 
ch 20-21. Also see Sarah Worthington, “Fiduciaries: Following Finn” in 
Tim Bonyhady, ed, Finn’s Law: An Australian Justice (Leichhardt, Austl: 
Federation Press, 2016)(forthcoming).
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label. The fiduciary label (as we now understand it)29 describes people 
who are expected “act in another’s interest” in a very special way: these are 
people who are required to put the other’s interests ahead of their own, 
and to the extent that they do not do this they will have to disgorge the 
benefits thereby obtained. This is quite unusual intervention.30 This duty 
can be breached even when all the other duties are not.31 When is this 
sort of intervention necessary if the arrangement between the parties is to 
be functional? In short, moving from the language of people-labelling to 
the language of obligation-labelling,32 when are obligations of self-denial 
needed? When is it appropriate to prevent one party pursuing conflicting 
29. Contrast the approach taken in Finn’s classic work on fiduciaries, Finn, 
Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 8. There, all the equitable duties just 
listed were covered. This was done precisely because the courts had used 
the word “fiduciary” to describe the people subject to these rules. But 
Finn made the point that very different people were subject to each rule, 
and the consequences varied for each rule, and each therefore needed to 
be considered quite independently.
30. See Worthington, Equity, supra note 6 ch 5. See, for example, Henderson v 
Merrett Syndicates Ltd, [1995] 2 AC 145 (HL) at 206, per Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. Note that there are some exceptions. Attorney General v Blake, 
[2000] UKHL 45 [Blake] is an exception in contract law, although it 
has not been widely adopted despite early fears; see Sarah Worthington 
& Roy Goode, “Commercial Law: Confining the Remedial Boundaries” 
in David Hayton, ed, Law’s Future(s): British Legal Developments in the 
21st Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) at 281-312. See too the 
various interpretations of Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes 
Ltd, [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Ch (Eng)), discussed in Andrew Burrows, “Are 
‘Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis’ Compensatory, Restitutionary, 
or Neither?” in Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington, eds, Current 
Themes in the Law of Contract Damages (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 
165 at 165-85; and Sarah Worthington, “Reconsidering Disgorgement” 
(1999) 62:2 Modern Law Review 218.
31. Boardman v Phipps, [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL) is typically cited.
32. It turns out that this is crucial across the board, but especially so in 
considering remedies: see the discussion in Part IV below, and also Bank of 
New Zealand v New Zealand Guardian Trust Co Ltd, [1999] 1 NZLR 664 
(CA) at 686, per Tipping J [Bank of New Zealand].
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gains?33
This question clearly requires more work. A move on language is 
unlikely to be the only move needed in delivering a tighter analysis of 
“who is a fiduciary”, but it has some ramifications which are immediately 
evident. The fiduciary no-conflicts rule is, at base, directed at ensuring 
that the fiduciary does not compete, i.e. does not pursue her own interests 
in arenas which lie within the scope of her fiduciary role, however wide or 
narrow that might be. It says nothing about carrying out the tasks which 
are assigned; nothing, for example, about making shrewd investments or 
distributing assets properly and wisely. Other rules are required to deliver 
those ends. So the question becomes, when is a “non-compete” rule 
essential, so much so that the law will impose it? It is perhaps easy to see 
why it is needed with company directors (especially since companies can 
act only through human agents, and, primarily, precisely the agents on 
whom the non-compete restriction is imposed);34 similarly with trustees, 
and by extension with agents.35 But it is far less clear that it is needed 
with solicitors (unless they too are also holding assets on trust), or Crown 
servants, even though these people are commonly included in lists of 
33. And constraints should not be imposed unless they are essential, not 
merely pleasing extras: see generally, Sarah Worthington, “Common 
Law Values: The Role of Party Autonomy in Private Law” in Andrew 
Robertson & Michael Tilbury, eds, The Common Law of Obligations: 
Divergence and Unity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) ch 14. Also see 
Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce”, supra note 9 (“[i]t is 
of the first importance not to impose fiduciary obligations on parties to a 
purely commercial relationship who deal with each other at arms’ length 
and can be expected to look after their own interests” at 117-118). 
34. Noting that the fiduciary duty is owed to the company, not to the 
shareholders.
35. This is so even though in some cases the only thing these people have to 
do is comply with directions concerning the disposition of property. In 
these circumstances the non-compete rule is then limited to preventing 
the fiduciary from using the property to generate private gains: see Foskett 
v McKeown, [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL) [Foskett] (although the trustee in that 
case undoubtedly had broader duties). 
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status-based fiduciaries. This may be an historical hangover:36 with these 
people, surely, all the duties mentioned earlier will cover the required 
territory, providing adequate and appropriate protection to the parties to 
the relationship.37 
These are just the sorts of issues which must be addressed. What 
do we mean by the word “fiduciary”, and who is caught within its web? 
The modern battleground for applying the fiduciary label is typically 
joint venturers and financial advisers. The problems are easily extended 
36. See Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 8. Note e.g. the common 
use of expressions such as “relationships of trust and confidence” and 
“confidential relationships”. These relationships are not necessarily 
“fiduciary”, in the sense that the conflicts rule applies, although other 
equitable restrictions are apt. Employees provide an illustration. Older 
cases might have included employees in the list of status-based fiduciaries; 
see e.g. Hospital Products Ltd, supra note 23 at para 68. But the modern 
approach is quite different: see Ranson v Customer Systems, [2012] EWCA 
Civ 841; Helmet Integrated Systems Ltd v Tunnard, [2006] EWCA Civ 
1735; University of Nottingham v Fishel, [2000] ICR 1462 (QB (Eng)) 
especially at 1491, per Elias J.
37. It is not to the point that fiduciary constraints would provide even better 
protection: they always would. With a few notable exceptions, the cases 
seem to support the non-fiduciary approach mooted here. “Fiduciary” 
cases concerning solicitors typically seek remedies for non-disclosure, fair-
dealing, proper purposes, negligence, etc., or misuse of client trust funds. 
These are not remedies for “competition”/breach of the no-conflict rule 
(unless in making profits from the trust fund, which is caught by “trustee” 
fiduciary rules). So far as Crown or public servants are concerned, the 
general rule is that employees are not fiduciaries: see note 36. The well-
known exceptional cases are Attorney General v Goddard (1929), 98 LJKB 
743 (Eng); Reading v Attorney General, [1951] AC 507 (HL); and Attorney 
General for Hong Kong v Reid, [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC (NZ)) [Reid]. The 
former decisions have been criticised by many commentators: see e,g. 
Gareth Jones, “Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty” 
(1968) 84:4 Law Quarterly Review 472; Finn, Fiduciary Obligations, 
supra note 8 at 215. And the last case, along with Blake, supra note 30, 
might be seen as a hard case making bad law, both cases being stymied 
by jurisdictional issues in pursuing what were seen a justified remedies 
(although, to be fair, there is no hint of this motivating the courts or 
affecting their deliberations). 
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to all commercial intermediaries. When Sir Anthony Mason described 
fiduciary law as “a concept in search of a principle” he made a troubling 
assessment of the territory under discussion and our inability to be certain 
about rights and duties and the reasons for imposing them.38 This, then, 
is the first question which needs a compelling answer: who is a fiduciary? 
Or, as I would prefer to put it, who is subject to the no-conflicts/non-
compete rule, and therefore to the unusual disgorgement liabilities which 
then follow? 
III. What?: What do Fiduciaries Have to Do?
The question here is clear. Even if we cannot say precisely who is a 
fiduciary, can we at least say precisely what such a person, once identified, 
will have to do? Although I start with the now conventional divisions of 
the duties owed by fiduciaries, the point I want to make in this Part is 
more subtle: it is to highlight the modern risk of misjudging the non-
fiduciary duties owed by fiduciaries. 
The words of Lord Millett (Millett LJ as he was) are familiar: 
[t]he distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty … 
[This] core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in good faith; he 
must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position 
where his duty and his interest may conflict ... 39
Note that Lord Millett speaks of the distinguishing obligation, not 
the only obligation. This was a point made in the previous Part. It is 
now accepted modern orthodoxy that “[n]ot every breach of duty by a 
38. Anthony Mason, “Themes and Prospects” in Paul Desmond Finn, ed, 
Essays in Equity (Sydney: Law Book Co, 1985) 242 at 246.
39. Bristol, supra note 23 at 18.
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fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary duty”.40 Note too that this distinguishing 
obligation — an obligation of loyalty — does not raise an expectation of 
benefits to be delivered. It requires only that the fiduciary counterparty 
will not exploit the relationship for personal gain, but will — and will be 
obliged to — put the principal’s interests ahead of the fiduciary’s. Only 
to the extent that she acts contrary to that will fiduciary law intervene.
In the language we are used to, fiduciary rules are proscriptive rules, 
40. Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce”, supra note 9 at 218. 
In Bristol, supra note 23 (Millett LJ rejected “unthinking resort to verbal 
formulae”, insisting that the fiduciary label should be “confined to those 
duties which are peculiar to fiduciaries and the breach of which attracts 
legal consequences differing from those consequent upon the breach of 
other duties” at 16). Also see Finn, “The Fiduciary Principle”, supra note 
11 at 27-28. See too, Chan v Zacharia (1984), 154 CLR 178 (HCA)
(Deane J put it this way: “… the one ‘fundamental rule’ embodies two 
themes. The first is that which appropriates for the benefit of the person to 
whom the fiduciary duty is owed any benefit or gain obtained or received 
by the fiduciary in circumstances where there existed a conflict of personal 
interest and fiduciary duty or a significant possibility of such conflict: the 
objective is to preclude the fiduciary from being swayed by considerations 
of personal interest. The second is that which requires the fiduciary to 
account for any benefit or gain obtained or received by reason of or by 
use of his fiduciary position or of opportunity or knowledge resulting 
from it: the objective is to preclude the fiduciary from actually misusing 
his position for his personal advantage. Notwithstanding authoritative 
statements to the effect that the ‘use of fiduciary position’ doctrine is but 
an illustration or part of a wider ‘conflict of interest and duty’ doctrine 
[see e.g. Kuys, supra note 24] the two themes, while overlapping, are 
distinct. Neither theme fully comprehends the other and a formulation of 
the principle by reference to one only of them will be incomplete” at 198-
99) [Chan]; and Lac Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd, 
[1989] 2 SCR 574 per Sopinka J (“not all obligations existing between 
the parties to a well-recognized fiduciary relationship will be fiduciary in 
nature” at 597).
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not prescriptive ones.41 The fiduciary is not positively obliged to act in the 
interests of the principal, with damages awarded for failure to deliver some 
advantageous end-point.42 This is important. What is special about the 
fiduciary role is something essentially negative:43 fiduciary relationships 
demand self-denial, not due care and obedience to agreed terms.44 As 
already noted, this rather dramatic constraint on party autonomy is rare 
in private law.
But notice too that the resulting interventions are rather narrow. 
Paul Finn stressed the consequences of this realignment from the older 
approach to fiduciaries to this new more restrictive approach, and the 
detail merits repeating: 
[l]oyalty is thus exacted, often in a draconian way. But … no more than loyalty 
is exacted. This warrants emphasis. It is not the case that the pure negligence 
of a lawyer, an agent’s excess of authority, a partner’s breach of the partnership 
contract or a trustee’s improvident investment is, as such, a breach of fiduciary 
duty, no matter how harmful to the interests of the client, the principal, etc. If 
no issue of disloyalty is involved, such matters will be actionable through those 
primary bodies of law which constitute or govern the ordinary incidents of the 
41. P & V Industries Pty Ltd v Porto, [2006] VSC 131 (Austl)(“[t]his means 
that the no conflict and no profit rules encompass the whole content 
of fiduciary obligations and the duty of loyalty imposed on a fiduciary 
is promoted by prohibiting disloyalty rather than by prescribing some 
positive duty” at para 23). Similarly, see Bristol, supra note 23 at 18; Breen 
v Williams (1996), 186 CLR 74 (HCA) at 113 [Breen]; Attorney-General 
v Blake, [1998] Ch 439 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) at 455 (not affected by the 
appeal). 
42. Ibid at 137-38; Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd, [2001] HCA 31 at para 74, 
but generally, see also paras 69-83. Also see Geraint Thomas, “The Duty 
of Trustees to Act in the ‘Best Interests’ of their Beneficiaries” (2008) 2:3 
Journal of Equity 177.
43. See Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce”, supra note 9  
(“[i]t is the principle that a man must not exploit the relationship for 
his own benefit. This is what distinguishes a fiduciary relationship from 
a commercial one” at 222), but generally, see also 219-21. Millett was 
clearly much influenced by Finn’s work, citing it here with warm approval.
44. Although those duties, and others too, may well be owed by the fiduciary. 
See Worthington, “Fiduciaries: When Is Self-Denial Obligatory?”, supra 
note 26.
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relationship in question – negligence, breach of contract or breach of trust.45
That is worth reading twice. Modern fiduciary law — and the particular 
idea of “loyalty” it describes — may be comprehensively addressed by 
rather tightly defined proscriptive obligational rules relating exclusively 
to improper profits from misuse of position and the avoidance of 
conflicts of interest and duty.46 But inevitably fiduciaries, as individuals, 
are subject to a great number of other legal rules, breach of which will 
also deliver useful remedies. 
This means there are two different answers to the “What?” question. 
There is the narrow proscriptive conflicts/misuse of position rule which 
constrains fiduciary activity, and is accepted as defining the territory of 
the rules which are unique to fiduciaries. But there are also all the other 
obligations to which a fiduciary may be subject — typically to:47 (i) 
comply with the terms of the engagement; (ii) in an appropriate manner; 
and — returning to fiduciary proscriptions — (iii) do so loyally. 
45. Finn, “The Fiduciary Principle”, supra note 11 at 28. 
46. Dividing these two limbs is common modern practice (see e.g. Chan, 
supra note 40 at 198-99, per Deane J) but in practice it is difficult to 
think of misuses of position which do not also involve conflicts of duty 
and interest: see the discussion in Sarah Worthington, “Fiduciary Duties 
and Proprietary Remedies: Addressing the Failure of Equitable Formulae” 
(2013) 72:3 Cambridge Law Journal 720 at 732-35 [Worthington, 
“Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies”] (suggesting that Reid, supra 
note 37, might provide a very rare illustration; it seems that all the other 
classic fiduciary cases can be classified, or re-classified, with relative ease as 
conflicts cases).
47. Typically we do not separate out clearly enough exactly what — from 
the various options on this list — the trustee has done which counts as 
a wrong and has caused the loss, etc. Often the identified categories are 
called different things by different judges and academics (see Redler, supra 
note 4 at paras 59-60; and Bank of New Zealand, supra note 32 at 687, 
per Tipping J). Often the context is identified rather than the particular 
duty in issue: e.g. custodial and management stewardship. This then 
leads to talk of substitutive and reparative compensation, falsifying and 
surcharging, accounting on the basis of wilful default, and restitutive 
and restitutionary damages, all aligned precisely with particular different 
contexts, but perhaps not precisely enough with particular different 
wrongs. Not much of this is then sufficiently useful or informative.
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Another way of making the same point is to consider not the duties 
themselves, but the context of what can go wrong. Take the case of a 
trust, as it provides a simple illustration with several possibilities for 
mistakes to be made:
• Wrongful paying out of assets: this covers payments 
out contrary to terms (either payments for disallowed 
investments or to disallowed beneficiaries) or payments 
out based on a wrong decision-making process, etc. (e.g. 
in determining which investments/exchanges to pursue, or 
which beneficiaries should receive a share). Note that the 
former attracts strict liability; the latter requires proof of 
the abuse. And note too that the wrongful disposition may 
have been in return for something now in the trust fund (or 
now on-delivered to the beneficiary — as indeed in Target 
Holdings Ltd v Redferns48 (“Target Holdings”) and Redler49), 
or may have been paid to a beneficiary who is not entitled 
(as in Re Diplock50), or indeed may be a “hand in the till” 
breach by the trustee (as in Foskett v McKeown51 — and note 
that here, but only here, there is disloyalty as well as breach 
of trust, and the disgorgement remedy is an alternative); or
• Wrongful management of the assets: this typically involves 
negligence of some form or other (e.g. in investment, 
custody, insurance, taking advice, etc.). Here there is an 
obvious overlap with the previous category: is a negligent 
investment decision the “wrongful paying out of assets?” But 
the former category does not cover the field: e.g. negligent 
custody leading to theft or damage of the Picasso painting is 
clearly in this category, but is not a “wrongful paying out”. 
48. Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns, [1996] AC 421 (HL) [Target Holdings]. See 
the discussion below in Part IV.B: What Losses Must be Compensated?
49. Redler, supra note 4. See the discussion below in Part IV.B: What Losses 
Must be Compensated? 
50. Ministry of Health v Simpson, [1951] AC 251 (HL)(sub nom Re Diplock).
51. Foskett, supra note 35.
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• Disloyalty: this involves the trustee acting disloyally in her 
own interests, for gain. Then the remedy is disgorgement 
of the disloyal gain: the focus is on fiduciary’s enhanced 
position, not claimant’s damaged one. The gain in question 
may have come directly from the trust fund (as when the 
trustee puts her hand in the till, or enters into a self-dealing 
sale or purchase transaction), or may be gained from an 
independent source, but one which must necessarily involve 
a conflict of duty and interest or a misuse of fiduciary 
position. Absent a breach of this “non-compete” rule, the 
fiduciary’s gain is not disloyal and need not be disgorged.
This multiplicity of duties to which the typical fiduciary is subject creates 
a potential problem which is not often highlighted. In older cases, 
decided before much of the modern writing on fiduciaries emerged, 
judges typically identified relationships as fiduciary (or not), and with 
that label then felt able to fine tune every aspect of the relationship to 
ensure that moral ends were delivered, often with little explanation or 
justification. As Robert Austin put it: 
[i]f a relationship was fiduciary, that characteristic was taken to be at the heart 
of the entire relationship, identifying more than merely one or a few duties 
amongst many. … Generally, fiduciary terminology was applied, often loosely, 
to standards of good faith, disclosure standards, limits on the proper exercise of 
discretionary powers, and even ‘fiduciary care’.52 
More than that, the remedies — if I can pre-empt the next Part, but 
at this stage only for the purpose of illuminating the “What?” question 
52. Robert P Austin, “Moulding the Content of Fiduciary Duties” in AJ 
Oakley, ed, Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) 153 at 156-57. See too the earlier comments on 
solicitors and employees, supra notes 36 and 37.
743(2016) 2(2) CJCCL
— were typically discussed through the language of “account”.53 This 
language was routinely used to deal with all these duties, regardless of 
whether the duties were especially fiduciary, or even especially equitable. 
The modern debates over the nature of the fiduciary’s duty of care are 
stark reminder of this sort of slippage, with only slow realisation that the 
duty of care owed by a fiduciary is of the same nature as the duty of care 
owed by other parties.54 The risk is then very high that like cases will not 
be treated alike. The remedies for fiduciary negligence, for example, or 
fiduciary abuse of powers, or fiduciary failure to comply with the terms of 
the engagement, are at risk of being determined on a different basis from 
breaches of the same sorts of rules by non-fiduciary parties. This may be 
the right approach, but it needs more by way of justification than mere 
assertion that “[t]he fiduciary relationship is a creature of equity and 
the remedy for breach of a fiduciary’s equitable obligations lies within 
equity’s exclusive jurisdiction”.55 The key issue is the particular obligation 
in issue, not the particular relationship.
Moreover, the language of account brings added disadvantages. First, 
it is not illuminating. An assertion that
[t]he primary remedy for breach of trust is not equitable compensation but 
account, and the orders which follow are not compensatory but restorative; 
the court enforces the trustee’s duty to account for his stewardship of the trust 
53. This is certainly true for trustees, and generally true for agents and 
partners; it is not common with company directors. For a short 
description of account, see Peter Birks, “Equity in the Modern Law: An 
Exercise in Taxonomy” (1996) 26:1 University of Western Australia Law 
Review 1, especially at 45-48; and Libertarian Investments Ltd v Hall 
(2013), 16 HKCFAR 681 at paras 166-73, per Lord Millett NPJ [Hall].
54. Now see Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (1994), 11 WAR 187 (SC 
(Austl)) at 238, per Ipp J; Bristol, supra note 23 at 17; Hall, ibid at 77. 
Of course, the fiduciary context will influence what counts as a breach: 
contrast the duty of care in trust investment (see Trustee Act 2000 (UK), 
c 29, s 1; and Speight v Gaunt, [1883] 9 App Cas 1 (HL) [Speight]) with 
that which might be owed in other contexts (including other fiduciary 
contexts).
55. Millett, “The Common Lawyer”, supra note 5 at 194. 
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fund and to make good any deficit which appears when the account is taken56 
says little which helps in deciding the basis by which to measure the 
“deficit” which must be made good (or, in other contexts, the profits 
which must be disgorged).57 Secondly, the language of account necessarily 
segregates fiduciary analysis from common law notions of compensating 
for loss (surely not too far removed from “making good a deficit”?). The 
inevitable consequence is that potentially relevant analogies are missed.
In considering the duties owed by fiduciaries, two ideas are 
important. First, that modern analysis recognises that fiduciaries typically 
owe their principals a good number of different duties. Many are of the 
same type as owed by non-fiduciaries in similar contexts. Only one — 
the proscriptive fiduciary duty of loyalty — is unique to fiduciaries. 
And secondly, going against this, historical fiduciary language was to 
the opposite effect: “fiduciary” described a relationship, embracing all 
the relationship duties, and “account” provided the vehicle for all the 
remedies. The tension in moving forward is obvious.
It follows that my second intractable question is this. Given the 
history of assessing all fiduciary remedies in a distinctive way — by 
account — and given that remedial consequences depend on the precise 
nature of the particular obligation breached or right infringed,58 is there 
anything which renders all the various non-fiduciary duties somehow 
different when owed by a fiduciary from when they are not? I suggest 
there is not, or no more than merely reflects the different context. If this is 
true, then principle, policy, language and analysis must be appropriately 
and carefully attuned to reflect that truth. 
56. Ibid. Although contrast the assertion in Hall, supra note 53, per Lord 
Millett NPJ (“[i]t is often said that the primary remedy for breach of trust 
or fiduciary duty is an order for an account, but this is an abbreviated and 
potentially misleading statement of the true position. In the first place an 
account is not a remedy for wrong ... “ at para 167). 
57. See the section on account in Worthington, “Fiduciary Duties and 
Proprietary Remedies”, supra note 46.
58. Redler, supra note 4 at para 76, per Lord Toulson.
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IV. So What?: What Remedies Follow a Breach of  
Duty by Fiduciaries
The previous Parts provide an entrée to the core debates over remedies. 
This is always where the battles are hardest fought. A discussion of 
remedies is often assisted by examples, and, as indicated at the outset, I 
will use two cases by way of illustration: FHR59 on the remedies for breach 
of the proscriptive fiduciary duty, and Redler60 on the remedies for breach 
of the non-fiduciary duties owed by fiduciaries. Both are controversial; 
both were decided over a year ago, and neither seems to have settled the 
debates completely.
A. What Profits Must be Disgorged?: Constructive 
Trusts and Personal Disgorgement of Profits
Disloyal profiteering by fiduciaries comes in two basic guises. These reflect 
the two broad practical ways in which a fiduciary holding assets under 
management (whether on trust or not) can make an unauthorised personal 
profit. First, the fiduciary can deal disloyally with the assets themselves. 
She can do this simply by taking these assets without authority (a “hand 
in the till” type of breach); alternatively, she can engineer a transaction 
where she is on both sides of the deal, either buying from or selling to 
herself on behalf of her principal (a “self-dealing” transaction). In either 
case the dealing clearly involves a conflict between duty to the principal 
and personal self-interest. In these circumstances the disgorgement 
remedy is universally conceded to exist, and to be proprietary. If the 
trustee simply takes the asset from a trust fund, the asset will continue 
to be held on the original trusts, and its traceable proceeds will be held 
59. FHR, supra note 3.
60. Redler, supra note 4.
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on constructive trust.61 Alternatively, if the transaction is a self-dealing 
transaction, then a different route leads to the same ultimate ends: the 
transaction is voidable at the election of the principal (subject to the 
usual constraints on rescission), thus compelling the fiduciary to return 
the original managed asset (or its value), but requiring the principal to 
return whatever was received in exchange.62 Of course, the principal’s 
remedy can only be proprietary if the assets which must be handed back 
to the principal are identifiable; even if they are not, the fiduciary will still 
be subject to a personal obligation to disgorge profits.63 These outcomes 
are not in dispute and are not considered further.
Secondly, the fiduciary may make a disloyal profit without directly 
subtracting assets from the trust fund or fiduciary “pot”. This is typically 
done by competing with the principal (or “the trust”) for an opportunity 
or advantage which, if the fiduciary had acted loyally, might have been 
acquired for the principal.64 This can include pursuing competing 
business opportunities, or taking a bribe or secret commission from 
the counterparty to a deal being done on behalf of the principal. This 
latter was the FHR context: that case involved a £10 million bribe, or 
a secret commission, taken by an agent who was negotiating the sale 
of a hotel complex. The principal sued the agent for disgorgement, 
successfully alleging the remedy was proprietary: i.e. the bribe was held 
61. Many cases could be cited, but see e.g. Docker v Soames (1834), 39 ER 
1095 (Ch); Aberdeen Town Council v Aberdeen University (1877), 2 App 
Cas 544 (HL); Scott v Scott (1963), 109 CLR 649 (HCA); Paul A Davies 
(Aus) Pty Ltd v Davies (No2), [1983] 1 NSWLR 440 (CA (Austl)); and 
perhaps most famously Foskett, supra note 35. And in the corporate 
context, where there is no initial trust or title split, the misappropriated 
corporate funds will be held on constructive trust. 
62. See e.g. Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878), 3 App Cas 1218 
(HL); Re Cape Breton Co (1885), 29 Ch D 795 (CA (Eng)); P&O 
Steam Navigation Co v Johnson (1938), 60 CLR 189 (HCA); Maguire v 
Makaronis (1997), 188 CLR 449 (HCA).
63. McKenzie v McDonald, [1927] VLR 134 (SC (Aust))(also noting 
compensation as a further alternative remedy if raised on the facts (as it 
was here)).
64. Classic modern descriptions would also add the possibility of disloyal 
gains made by “misuse of position”, but see supra note 46.
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by the fiduciary on constructive trust for the principal. Here the remedial 
analysis is more difficult.
Everyone concedes that the disloyal fiduciary cannot keep the gains: 
the fiduciary must “account” to the principal for them. What had been 
in dispute in England for 20 years or more was whether the disgorgement 
remedy was proprietary or personal. This is the debate which FHR settled: 
the remedy is proprietary. Settlement of the issue is certainly welcome, 
although we might now say that in England we know that the remedy 
is proprietary, because the Supreme Court has said so, but we still do 
not know quite why it is, or why it should be so. This question needs 
answering, or its ramifications will return to haunt us.
Almost twenty years before FHR,65 the Privy Council in AG for Hong 
Kong v Reid66 (“Reid”) had suggested that, if the fiduciary had to account, 
it then followed from the very nature of things that such a remedy would 
be proprietary if the gain was identifiable, since “equity treats as done 
that which ought to be done”.67 This held sway as the dominant view for 
decades, both in England and in many Commonwealth jurisdictions. 
It was a view which had explicitly rejected an earlier Court of Appeal 
65. This description of context is abbreviated from Worthington, “Fiduciary 
Duties and Proprietary Remedies”, supra note 46 at 723-24.
66. Reid, supra note 37. A public prosecutor in Hong Kong took bribes 
to “lose” files, thus subverting prosecutions. The bribes were used to 
buy houses in New Zealand, held in the names of the fiduciary’s wife 
and solicitor. The Privy Council held that the fiduciary (or his wife or 
solicitor) held the bribes or their proceeds on constructive trust for the 
Crown.
67. Ibid at 331. If it makes a difference, Lord Millett has added a further gloss 
to this, suggesting that the conclusion can be justified on the basis that the 
breach was not the fiduciary’s receipt of the bribe, but the failure to hand 
it over: Peter Millett, “Restitution and Constructive Trusts” (1998) 114:3 
Law Quarterly Review 399 at 407. Also see Peter Millett, “Proprietary 
Restitution” in Simone Degeling & James Edelman, eds, Equity in 
Commercial Law (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2005) 309 at 324 [Millett, 
“Proprietary Restitution”].
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decision in Lister & Co v Stubbs68 (“Lister”) which had held that 
proprietary remedies would lead to such unacceptable consequences for 
third parties that they could not possibly represent the law. In short, at 
least in relation to bribes, Reid took one firm view of what ought to be 
done, and Lister another. Commentators were divided. 
The difference matters because all sides are agreed that if the 
principal’s remedy is proprietary then it carries with it a number of 
significant advantages. Most obviously, it entitles the principal to 
insolvency protection as against the fiduciary’s creditors; to trace into 
identifiable exchange products; and to follow the asset or its traceable 
proceeds into the hands of third parties who are not bona fide purchasers 
for value without notice of the principal’s interest. All these proprietary 
consequences significantly privilege the principal, and all are contingent 
on the initial claim to the disloyal profits being proprietary. 
In the face of this longstanding debate, the UK Supreme Court 
judgment was relatively brief: fifty-one paragraphs, none of them especially 
long. Lord Neuberger PSC delivered the judgment for the court, and made 
little of the fact that he was overruling his own sustained deliberations 
in Sinclair v Versailles,69 an earlier case in the Court of Appeal, where — 
supported by precedent70 — he had preferred the outcome in Lister. It 
does not omit much detail to summarise the Supreme Court judgment 
as follows: the choice between the two competing views (i.e. proprietary 
and non-proprietary disgorgement) must be based on “legal principle, 
decided cases, policy considerations, and practicalities”;71 neither decided 
cases nor the writings of academics suggest any plainly right or plainly 
wrong answer;72 in these circumstances, and “in the absence of any other 
68. (1890), LR 45 Ch D 1 (CA (Eng)). In Lister & Co v Stubbs, an agent took 
bribes from the vendor in return for contracts with his principal. The 
Court of Appeal held that the agent was personally liable to the principal 
for the value of the bribe only, and neither the bribe nor its successful 
investment proceeds were held on constructive trust for the principal.
69. [2011] EWCA Civ 347 [Sinclair].
70. Although he defended his conclusions on the basis of precedent, principle 
and policy. 
71. FHR, supra note 3 at para 12. 
72. Ibid at para 32.
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good reason, it would seem right to opt for the simple [i.e. proprietary] 
answer”;73 that other common law countries do this;74 that principle75 
and policy76 (both rather scantily addressed) support this approach; and 
precedent77 does not contradict it. Especially in the latter steps, there 
seems to be an implicit presumption that almost universally conceded 
personal obligations to disgorge are, and should be, the equivalent of 
proprietary remedies, at least when owed by fiduciaries.78 This may well 
be right, but it is the question in issue, not its robust answer. And I say 
that as one who has argued that the remedy should indeed be proprietary 
in every case I can think of other than Reid.
This criticism is hardly fair, perhaps. Even the most committed 
adherents seem to have problems justifying the move from widely-
accepted personal remedies for fiduciary disgorgement to the more 
contested remedies by way of a constructive trust. It was Lord Millett’s 
article in the Restitution Law Review79 which underpinned Lord 
Templeman’s proprietary analysis in Reid, and Lord Millett has pursued 
this theme in the intervening 20 odd years, including commenting on 
FHR itself.80
Lord Millett’s most recent elaboration of the outcome is that equity 
does not provide a proprietary remedy for breach of a personal obligation; 
it “provides a personal remedy which has proprietary consequences”.81 
The footnoted explanation of this is that it “is in accordance with the 
73. Ibid at para 35.
74. Ibid at para 45.
75. Ibid at paras 33, 36.
76. Ibid at paras 42-43.
77. Ibid at para 45.
78. Ibid at paras 33, 36, 42-44.
79. Peter Millett, “Bribes and Secret Commissions” (1993) 1 Restitution Law 
Review 7.
80. See e.g. Millett, “Proprietary Restitution”, supra note 67; Peter Millett, 
“Bribes and Secret Commissions Again” (2012) 71:3 Cambridge Law 
Journal 583 [Millett, “Bribes and Secret Commissions Again”]; and 
Millett, “The Common Lawyer”, supra note 5.
81. Millett, “The Common Lawyer”, supra note 5 at 196.
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obligational theory of the [express] trust” and with Maitland’s ideas.82 
And so it is. But an obligation to hold assets on an express trust for 
certain beneficiaries is quite some distance from an obligation to disgorge 
disloyal gains to the principal. However, Lord Millett takes some time to 
explain why the outcome for express trusts is equally applicable in this 
disgorgement context. The core idea depends on accounting, and comes 
from an assertion that where equity enforces performance of a personal 
obligation in relation to specific property, it does so by ordering accounts 
to be taken as if the obligation had been performed when it should 
have been, and this, in modern terminology, constitutes a proprietary 
remedy.83 
Accounting is surely a distraction: it does not indicate whether 
the remedy is personal or proprietary.84 The accounting process can be 
adopted in compensation cases when the remedy can only be personal. 
And in earlier bribe cases the defaulting fiduciary’s obligation to “account 
in equity”85 was taken by some to indicate that the disgorgement 
obligation was personal only (Lister, Sinclair)86 and by others to indicate 
precisely the opposite, that it was inherently proprietary (Reid). 
Omitting the accounting distraction, it certainly seems true that 
specific enforcement of an obligation in relation to identified property 
has proprietary consequences. This explains express trusts and equitable 
security interests; it explains proprietary estoppel; it explains constructive 
and resulting trusts in all the cases other than fiduciary disgorgement. So 
why not in the fiduciary disgorgement cases too? 
True, it might do that, but before we can say so it is important to 
82. Ibid at 196, n 10.
83. Ibid at 196-98.
84. See Worthington, “Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies”, supra 
note 46 at 736-38. 
85. And indeed it is a moot point whether the language applies only to 
trustees or more widely to fiduciaries in general. It is commonly said that 
fiduciaries (using the expression generally) are obliged to “account in 
equity”, but assertions that the principal can “falsify” or “surcharge” the 
accounts is typically confined to express trustees.
86. Also see William Swadling, “The Fiction of the Constructive Trust” 
(2011) 64:1 Current Legal Problems 399.
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notice one very dramatic difference between the last example and all the 
others. Disloyal gains must be disgorged because the fiduciary must not 
have them, even though there is no inherent and often no particular reason 
why the principal must have them. This is why they are often described 
as windfalls to the principal. By contrast, in all the other examples above 
the core purpose of the obligation is to deliver a particular asset to the 
claimant, and, where a constructive trust is recognised, that is simply 
shorthand for the assertion that equity recognises that the claimant must 
have the asset in question, and can insist on having it not only as against 
the defendant but also as against any stranger to that relationship. This 
is what it means to have a proprietary interest in an asset. It follows that 
in the distinctive disgorgement cases there may be no reason to treat 
the principal as (already) owning the asset in equity. This may not be 
“what ought to be done”; it may not be the function of the disgorgement 
obligation. 
Put another way, if the purpose or objective of the disgorgement 
remedy is specifically to take the fiduciary back to first base, and not 
specifically to situate the principal at a particular endpoint, then the 
desired protection can be secured without the need for proprietary 
attributes.87 Of course, and by contrast, if the remedy is designed to give 
the principal what a proper performance of the fiduciary’s obligations is 
designed to deliver, then the answer is different, and the remedy might 
legitimately be proprietary, provided the underlying relationship is seen 
87. See the argument in Vanessa Finch & Sarah Worthington, “The Pari 
Passu Principle and Ranking Restitutionary Rights” in Francis Rose, ed, 
Insolvency and Restitution (London: Mansfield Press, 2000) ch 1.
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as sufficiently valuable to warrant “over-protecting” it in this way.88 
I attempted in my 2013 Cambridge Law Journal article to put forward 
just such an argument, and concluded that the disgorgement remedies 
could be justified as being proprietary on the basis that the principal did 
indeed have an entitlement to the disloyal gains in every case I could 
think of bar Reid.89 In short, in all cases bar this one, there was not merely 
a reason to remove the disloyal gains from the fiduciary; there was also a 
reason to give them to the principal. But the Supreme Court in FHR did 
not adopt this analysis. And nor did it provide one of its own, or not one 
which provides a compelling analytical foundation. 
The issue matters. The right analysis needs to settle conclusively and 
convincingly the competing arguments of principle and policy. Courts 
in other common law jurisdictions are clearly sufficiently alert to the 
competing policy arguments to have settled universally on the view that 
the constructive trust in these circumstances is “remedial”.90 This means 
that, just when proprietary consequences really matter, these courts have 
88. This last qualification is necessary. We are used to constructive trusts 
where common law damages are inadequate: this explains the vendor/
purchaser constructive trust (of land and Picasso paintings, etc., but 
not ordinary goods or shares), equitable security interests, etc. Here 
the law protects — “over-protects” — assets regarded as unusually 
special. But the protective title split in express trusts, and the 
proprietary remedies which follow mis-dealings in the trust assets, are 
not protecting “special” property. They might, however, be justified as 
“over-protecting” relationships regarded as especially deserving, being 
fiduciary relationships. This was the argument advanced in Worthington, 
Equity, supra note 6 ch 6. But even here the pre-requisite for this sort of 
protection ought to be that the asset in question is being held specifically 
for the principal, as indicated in the text above. 
89. This was the distinction sought to be addressed in Worthington, 
“Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies”, supra note 46 at 731-35. 
The conclusion reached was that all the cases on fiduciary breaches fell 
into the category meriting proprietary protection other than Reid, supra 
note 37, despite this being a case where it was awarded. See the similar 
argument, but focusing more on policy concerns, in Worthington, Equity, 
supra note 6 ch 5. 
90. For the detail, see Grimaldi, supra note 11; and Millett, “Bribes and Secret 
Commissions Again”, supra note 80.
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the right to, and may well, decide that a proprietary remedy should 
be denied.91 On insolvency, but also more generally, this discretionary 
approach to proprietary entitlements has little to recommend it.92 But 
just as it seems inappropriate for judges to “play God” over a claimant’s 
property rights — asserting that although there is an “entitlement” to a 
constructive trust or profits, this remedy might then be withheld if the 
circumstances are inappropriate — so too is it inappropriate in England 
to “play God” by insisting that the claimant does have a property right 
without properly justifying that superior level of protection. This is 
because granting the principal a proprietary right will inevitably have 
profound and generally detrimental effects on the rights of third parties 
not before the court. In this context the court cannot therefore simply 
take the simplest and most convenient approach to dealing with the two 
parties before the court.
This choice about where the benefits should lie is difficult because 
it is not a matter of doctrine; it is exclusively a matter of policy: what is 
the obligation in issue and what is its purpose? The appropriate remedy 
follows ineluctably from that. The essential choice is between seeing the 
fiduciary non-compete rule as so important to protecting the fiduciary 
relationship that, when the fiduciary does compete, the benefits of that 
competition should go to the principal, and do so in an “over-protective” 
91. See Grimaldi, supra note 11, per Finn J (“[t]o accept that money 
bribes can be captured by a constructive trust does not mean that they 
necessarily will be in all circumstances. As is well accepted, a constructive 
trust ought not to be imposed if there are other orders capable of doing 
full justice … Such could be the case, for example, where a bribed 
fiduciary, having profitably invested the bribe, is then bankrupted and, 
apart from the investment, is hopelessly insolvent. In such a case a lien 
on that property may well be sufficient to achieve ‘practical justice’ in the 
circumstances. This said, a constructive trust is likely to be awarded as of 
course where the bribe still exists in its original, or in a traceable, form, 
and no third party issue arises” at paras 582-83).
92. See the robust analysis in David Neuberger, “The Remedial Constructive 
Trust: Fact or Fiction” (speech delivered at the Banking Services and 
Finance Law Association Conference, New Zealand, 10 August 2014), 
online: The Supreme Court website <www.supremecourt.uk/docs/
speech-140810.pdf>.
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proprietary sense. (An allied conclusion might be that the fiduciary rule 
on disloyalty is comprehensively embraced by the non-compete rule, 
and that the misuse of position rule is merely a sub-category. I doubt 
anything would be lost by this move.) The alternative is that the fiduciary 
disloyalty rule is only proscriptive, not prescriptive, and its purpose is 
simply fiduciary profit-stripping, not delivery of any end-point for 
the principal, not even the one that the fiduciary has disloyally and 
competitively chosen for himself. The remedy would then be exclusively 
personal. This choice is not easy; there are good arguments both ways. 
But note that this choice concerns the non-compete rule, and could, if 
thought appropriate, be isolated from the remedies which follow misuse 
of any assets held in a fiduciary capacity.93 
So my third question on fiduciaries is this: what makes the 
disgorgement remedy proprietary? This question is difficult precisely 
because the answer depends on policy: what is the purpose of the 
fiduciary non-compete rule? The arguments are finely balanced. In this 
sense, the UK Supreme Court’s conclusion in FHR cannot be criticised 
— they plumped for a proprietary conclusion, as would I — but it would 
have been reassuring to have the problem and its resolution set out more 
robustly.
B. What Losses Must be Compensated?: Equitable 
Compensation and Accounting
The previous sub-Part dealt with the disgorgement remedy for breach 
of the non-compete/no conflicts fiduciary rule. This sub-Part deals with 
equitable compensation for losses caused by breach of the fiduciary’s non-
fiduciary duties. These include the fiduciary’s custody and management 
duties in relation to assets held in a fiduciary capacity,94 although 
93. Although those remedies also need work, especially when the fiduciary 
makes a profit from use of the assets. See Sarah Worthington, “Justifying 
Claims to Secondary Profits” in EJH Schrage, ed, Unjust Enrichment and 
the Law of Contract (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 451 at 
451 and the references cited there.
94. E.g. held by the fiduciary on trust or held by the director-fiduciary’s 
company.
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fiduciaries without such responsibilities are also in the frame.95 A simple 
illustration is provided by Redler,96 where solicitors paid away client 
trust assets contrary to settled instructions. The breach was clear, but the 
remedy disputed.
Something should be said at the outset about language. Had the 
claim in Redler been simply that the solicitors had committed a breach 
of contract, or been negligent, there would have been no debate about 
quantum.97 The dispute arose because the breaches also concerned 
fiduciaries dealing with trust assets. This meant that equitable obligations, 
equitable remedies (especially equitable compensation) and accounting 
all moved centre stage. 
These equitable tags are not necessarily illuminating. “Equitable 
compensation” illustrates the problem: the term is used even when 
the breach is not of an equitable obligation98 and the remedy is not 
compensating a loss.99 Labels aside, however, the legal question is 
important. Does the remedy available against the defaulting solicitors 
in Redler depend on their fiduciary status or the fact that they were 
misapplying trust assets?100 The question has been debated in England 
for over two decades, with two significant decisions defining the context: 
Redler in the Supreme Court in 2014 and Target Holdings101 in the House 
of Lords in 1996.
Both Redler and Target Holdings involved claims by banks against 
95. See e.g. Nocton v Lord Ashburton, [1914] AC 932 (HL); Bristol, supra note 
23.
96. Redler, supra note 4.
97. Ibid at para 71 (in the end, the Supreme Court held that the quantum of 
the remedy was the same for all the common law and equitable breaches). 
98. Being, alternatively, a breach by a fiduciary of non-fiduciary duties. See 
supra notes 52-58 and their associated texts. 
99. It is, instead, merely describing the provision of a monetary remedy rather 
than a remedy in specie, but the money may be providing compensation 
for loss, disgorgement of profits, or restitution of an unjust enrichment. 
100. Of course it would matter if the trust assets or their traceable proceeds 
remained in existence, but that was not the case here and can be ignored 
for present purposes.
101. Target Holdings, supra note 48.
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solicitors. In both cases the banks had lent large sums to purchasers 
of property, requiring those loans to be secured against the purchase 
property. In both cases the solicitors paid out the funds before obtaining 
the necessary security. In Target Holdings, security was obtained a short 
time later, so one might think no real harm was done. In Redler the result 
was that a first mortgage which should have been cleared was not, and it 
ranked ahead of AIB’s security to the extent of £300,000. In both cases, 
the purchasers defaulted on their repayments and the banks sought to 
enforce their security. And in both cases the property market had collapsed 
between the time of the initial loan and the time that enforcement was 
sought. As a result both banks faced large losses102 and both sought to 
make their trustee solicitors liable.
The banks’ arguments were simple. The loan funds had passed from 
the banks to their solicitors’ client accounts. These funds were held on 
trust, subject to the clients’ instructions: the funds should have been held 
until paid out as instructed. Instead, the funds were paid out contrary 
to instructions. The appropriate remedy in these circumstances, it was 
urged, was reinstatement of the trust fund wrongly paid away — i.e. 
replacement of the total loan funds, being £3.3 million for AIB and £1.5 
million for Target — but with both banks being required to bring into 
account what they had actually recovered from the sale of the properties. 
In this way, both banks would obtain effective protection against all their 
losses on the deals, recovering roughly £2.4 million from the solicitors 
in Redler, and £1 million in Target Holdings. 
The solicitors’ counterarguments were equally simple. The solicitors 
pointed out that even if they had performed precisely according to their 
instructions, Target would have suffered exactly the same loss, that loss 
being caused entirely by the fall in the property market not by any failure 
to get in the security; and AIB would have suffered a loss of only £300k, 
being the sum paid in priority to Barclays as a result of a first mortgage 
which it otherwise would not have had.
In short, depending on which argument was accepted, Target would 
recover either £1 million or nothing, and AIB would recover either £2.4 
102. £2.4 million for AIB and £1 million for Target Holdings.
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million or £300,000. The argument was clearly worth pursuing. In both 
cases the solicitors won, with the Supreme Court in Redler accepting the 
core argument in Target.
The problem looks relatively simple, and common sense might 
suggest that a different answer from that given by the courts would have 
been bizarre.103 But the Supreme Court did not simply rely on common 
sense. Their entire analysis was driven by one utterly compelling principle. 
This was that any analysis of remedial consequences must start with a 
precise understanding of the obligation which had been breached and the 
detailed performance requirements demanded by it.104 Only this would 
reveal the position the claimant would have been in if the obligation had 
not been breached. Knowing that was crucial if the remedial goal was to 
make the claimant “whole”, i.e. to give the claimant the money equivalent 
of what should have been given by proper performance.105 This focus on 
the particular obligation in issue is perhaps the most important message 
in the entire judgment, and is at risk of being lost sight of precisely 
because it is so simple. 
Following this approach, the court identified the relevant obligation 
as being to ensure that the trust fund was duly administered, and the 
remedy of equitable compensation as being designed to make good any 
loss suffered by reason of a failure to perform in that way.106 Of course, 
that does not deal with the peculiarly “equitable” features noted earlier, 
103. Although see the warning against the value of common sense in Leonard 
Hoffmann, “Common Sense and Causing Loss” (Lecture to the Chancery 
Bar Association, 15 June 1999), online: The Chancery Bar Association 
<www.chba.org.uk/for-members/library/annual-lectures/common-sense-
and-causing-loss>.
104. See e.g. Redler, supra note 4 at paras 52, 59, 61, 64, 66, 70, 76, per Lord 
Toulson SCJ, and paras 92-93, 138, per Lord Reed SCJ. Also see Bank 
of New Zealand, supra note 32, per Tipping J — cited in Redler at para 
59 — noting that the characterisation of the obligation in issue is what 
is crucial, not the characterisation of its historical source or of the entire 
relationship.
105. Of course there are other remedial goals, typically delivered by punitive, 
exemplary, restitutionary, disgorgement and reliance damages, but no one 
was suggesting that these were relevant on the facts here. 
106. Redler, supra note 4, per Lord Toulson SCJ at paras 64, 66. 
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but, if this analysis is right, then there seems to be no good reason for 
treating the claim in equity any differently from a claim for damages 
for wrongdoing at common law. The duty is precisely the same whether 
defined in contract or in equity (if such is even possible). Even the critics 
agree with this.107
But this approach did not silence the critics. They suggest, variously, 
that the courts in Redler and Target Holdings had misunderstood the 
problem, or the solution, or both. One group of “dissentients” suggests 
that the flaw in both cases is a failure to appreciate the full range of 
different claims available against defaulting fiduciaries.108 On their 
analysis, there is effectively one additional claim in equity where both 
breach and loss are irrelevant. This, they say, was inexplicably ignored by 
both the Supreme Court and the House of Lords. For this reason they 
may well regard the issue as still open in the UK.
By contrast, Lord Millett considers the Supreme Court to have 
delivered the right answer, but for the wrong reasons,109 and indeed 
that it granted the wrong remedy.110 He thinks the remedy should not 
107. See note 108, below.
108. Most forcefully, see Charles Mitchell, “Causation, Remoteness, and 
Fiduciary Gains” (2006) 17:2 Kings College Law Journal 325; Charles 
Mitchell, “Stewardship of Property and Liability to Account” (2014) 78 
Conveyancer 211; Charles Mitchell, “Equitable Compensation for Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty” (2013) 66:1 Current Legal Problems 307; S Elliott & 
James Edelman, “Target Holdings Considered in Australia” (2003) 119:4 
Law Quarterly Review 545. Also see Agricultural Land Management Ltd v 
Jackson (No 2), [2014] WASC 102, per Edelman J; and James Edelman, 
“An English Misturning with Equitable Compensation” (delivered 
at the UNSW Australia colloquium on equitable compensation and 
disgorgement of profit, Australia, 7-8 August 2015), online: Federal Court 
of Australia <www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/justice-
edelman/edelman-j-201508>. These are the “dissentients” referred to in 
the discussion which follows. Taking a different but still critical line, see 
Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce”, supra note 9 (criticising 
Target Holdings as “disquieting”, “disappointing” and “misleading” at 
224). 
109. Millett, “The Common Lawyer”, supra note 5 at 199.
110. Ibid at 203.
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have been “[equitable] compensation for loss but payment of the sum 
necessary to make good a deficit in the trust account. A common lawyer 
should recognise the distinction; it is the difference between debt and 
damages”.111 It could equally well be called “reconstituting the trust 
fund” or “redrawing the trust account”.112 
But “reconstituting the trust fund” or “redrawing the trust account” 
does not tell you what ought to be there, which can then be compared 
with what is actually there, so that the deficit can be made good. That 
is precisely the question the Supreme Court sought to answer, and the 
question which the dissentients think they got wrong. Lord Millett’s debt 
analogy is one they use, and use to reach very different conclusions. How 
do they manage that?
These dissentients run their argument using either the old language 
of account or the modern language of compensation. In examining the 
trustee’s duties, they divide them this way: there are primary duties (to 
perform the trust) and secondary duties (to compensate for losses from 
non-performance or faults in performance), and of course fiduciary 
duties requiring disgorgement of disloyal benefits which can be left to 
one side for present purposes.
They then describe the different claims which are available for 
breaches of these different duties. The language used is important, and 
not necessarily easy or intuitive. In summary, a claimant might seek to: 
i. Enforce the primary duties: this is effectively the seeking of an order 
for specific performance of the trust obligations, or the money 
equivalent of specific performance. No breach is needed, so no 
issues of causation and remoteness arise. In accounting language, 
the beneficiary seeks to “falsify the account” — or seeks “substitutive 
compensation” — the objective is to “preserve the trust assets".
ii. Enforce the secondary duties: this is effectively the seeking of an order 
for repair of the damage caused to the trust fund by the breach (and 
is what the court did in Target Holdings and Redler). In accounting 
language, the beneficiary seeks to “surcharge the account” — or seeks 
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
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“reparative compensation” — the objective is to “manage the trust 
assets”.
iii. Enforce fiduciary loyalty: this does what it says. In accounting 
language, the beneficiary seeks an “account of profits” — or seeks 
“restitutionary/restorative compensation” (i.e. disgorgement) — the 
objective is to ensure “loyalty”. 
A beneficiary can elect between the first two remedies, and can have the 
third too if it is not inconsistent.113 
In Target Holdings and Redler, the proponents of this analysis note 
that the third option is not available, but suggest that the court focused 
on the second option and inexplicably ignored the first. According to the 
first option, they suggest, the trustee is obliged to hold the fund transferred 
on trust until it is paid out in an authorised way. This obligation to hold 
only comes to an end if the conditions for payment out are satisfied. The 
claim under the first option is a claim to enforce this duty of the trustee 
to hold the assets in this way, not a claim for compensation for breach. 
Under this head, the solicitors are obliged to restore the fund — i.e. pay 
into the trust fund £1.5 million in Target Holdings and £3.3 million in 
Redler.
They further suggest that if a common law analogue is thought 
helpful, the correct one is the action for the agreed sum (a debt, as Lord 
Millett put it), not a claim for damages. In this context, it is simply not 
to the point, they suggest, to insist that even if things had been done 
as they should have been, the funds would nevertheless have been lost. 
The clock is stopped before then, and there is no escape by arguing the 
counterfactual.
These arguments are invariably put very elegantly. And the analogy 
with contract is apt, certainly, but not a contract for an agreed sum, and 
not in a context where the clock can stop in this way. Two mistakes are 
being made here. First, the fiduciary’s obligation (the fiduciary’s primary 
duty) is not to pay an agreed sum, nor to hold a specific fund in a client 
account. The fiduciary’s obligation is far more complex, involving a series 
of steps which must all be taken if due performance is to be delivered. In 
113. Tang Man Sit v Capacious Investments Ltd, [1996] AC 514 (PC (HK)).
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the Redler context, these steps were designed to deliver a particular agreed 
end result. Theoretically, if specific performance were ordered against 
a recalcitrant solicitor, the requirement would be to perform fully, to 
execute all the steps, not merely to complete one or two steps and then 
stop. This is the obligation in issue. It is not merely a custodial obligation 
(to hold an asset with due care, etc.); it is a more complex mix of custodial 
and management obligations. Many contracts are of this form; so too are 
many trusts. Rather fewer are of the form “simply hold, carefully”, or 
“hold carefully and then hand over”, although perhaps trusts of family 
castles and art collections illustrate this genre.
Secondly, the analogy with debt is typically used to demonstrate a 
common law disregard for the claimant’s personal circumstances. When 
a claim is made in debt, proof of loss to the claimant is not part of the 
claim: it is irrelevant what the claimant intended to do with the money; 
it matters nought that she might either have invested it to great effect or 
simply given it away. The trust analogy, it is suggested, is that in cases 
such as Redler and Target Holdings, it matters not what would have 
happened after the restored funds were received; they must simply be 
restored. Performance is key, not loss.
But this reflects a second mistake. Performance of trustee 
obligations, or remedies for failure to perform, never look to the personal 
circumstances of the beneficiary or to making the beneficiary “whole”.114 
The trustee’s obligations relate exclusively to custody and management of 
the pot of trust assets, and both trustee performance and trustee remedies 
are directed solely to ensuring that the trust pot is kept in the state it 
ought to be in, or returned to that state if there has been any slippage. 
Unless the trust is terminated or the trustee dismissed, this duty persists. 
It follows that when the court assesses what ought to be in the trust pot, 
and makes that assessment at the date of judgment, it is not (despite its 
own assertions to contrary) making that assessment “with the benefit of 
hindsight”. It is simply assessing what state the trust pot ought to be 
at that date given the trustee’s ongoing duties up to that date. This does 
114. Other than in the incidental manner which may be required in a 
discretionary trust in deciding which beneficiaries should receive benefits. 
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not always make valuation easy,115 although typically there are fewer 
unknowns than with many complex contract and tort claims. And if 
the funds should have been dispersed to the beneficiary, an assessment 
is made of what ought to have been dispersed, at the appropriate date, 
from a trust pot which is presumed to have been in its required state, and 
that too then needs to be valued at the date of judgment and delivered 
to the beneficiary: that is what the beneficiary should have received.116 
Similarly, the rules of remoteness and foreseeability are not somehow 
uniquely inapplicable to the assessment of trust remedies. Given the 
focus on the identified pot of assets under the trustee’s management, 
it would simply be impossible for loss to the pot from a breach of the 
trustee’s duty to be either unforeseeable or too remote. Loss, and the 
kind of loss, is invariably foreseeable, even if its quantum is not. It is the 
particular trust context which denies these rules any relevance, not some 
peculiar equitable quirk. All this is a trap which both the House of Lords 
and the Supreme Court may equally have fallen into, given some of their 
general comments. 
The issues can be seen more clearly if illustrated. Take a simple 
example: a trustee takes £1 million from the trust funds for his own 
use, and uses it non-traceably. Assume that what he should have done, 
according to the trust deed, was invest these particular funds in shares 
which would now be worth £½ million. On these facts, two claims are 
open to the beneficiary. The first is a profits disgorgement claim for £1 
million: this is the gain the trustee made from appropriating the assets 
for himself, acting with a personal conflict, and the profits gained in this 
way must be disgorged; in assessing the gain, it is irrelevant what the 
trustee then does with the money.117 Alternatively, but to less advantage, 
115. See e.g. Hall, supra note 53; and even Dawson (dec’d), Re (1966), 2 NSWR 
211 (SC (Aust)) [Dawson].
116. Dawson ibid; Hall, Ibid. The beneficiary will not be able to argue that 
she would have made profitable investments, etc., in the interim, unless 
regard for this is also a provable part of the trustee’s (non-fiduciary) duties.
117. Unless of course the trustee uses the funds in a successful investment. 
Then the beneficiary might claim disgorgement of that benefit: Foskett, 
supra note 35. 
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the beneficiary could claim equitable compensation for breach of trust, 
requiring the trustee to restore the trust fund to the state it would have 
been in if proper performance had been delivered (or the state it would 
have been in had there been no breach; there is no difference between the 
two):118 i.e. £½ million. Of course, the market could equally well have 
moved the other way, and the nominated shares might now be worth 
£5 million. This, then, would be the measure of compensation required. 
Note that on these facts the required calculation is easy. It is a little 
more difficult if the trustee were obliged to manage the fund in the best 
interests of the beneficiary; then some “guessed” but rational assessment 
of the likely proper state of the fund would have to be made.119 
The cases routinely notice these two options — the disgorgement 
remedy and the compensation remedy — and notice too that the 
compensation remedy depends crucially on what ought to have been done 
with the fund. Merely insisting that a trustee must “account”, or pay 
“compensation” labelled in a particular way (see above), does not answer 
the question about what ends the remedy should deliver and how this is 
quantified. As the Supreme Court in Redler so clearly identified, the key 
issue in this analysis is determining exactly what proper performance of 
the obligation should have delivered to the principal. The gap between 
factual delivery and what ought to have been delivered gives the measure 
of equitable compensation.
This exposes my fourth question on fiduciaries. It is whether, 
in a modern context, we have any further need for this historical and 
distinctive language of “equitable compensation” or the process of 
“accounting” (other than “giving an account”, in the simple sense 
of requiring the fiduciary to provide information)? The focus should, 
it seems, be straightforwardly on the precise nature of the particular 
obligations in issue and their intended objectives. As it is, the language 
of equitable compensation and accounting lies like a cloak over so much 
118. Which makes the point that the remedies for breach of the trustee’s 
primary and secondary obligations come to the same thing. This is the 
conclusion also reached in Redler, supra note 4.
119. See Bartlett v Barclays Bank Trust Co Ltd (No 2), [1980] Ch 515 (Eng); 
Speight, supra note 54.
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of fiduciary law. It does not illuminate, explain or justify what goes on 
under its cover.
V. Conclusion
And that is it. The “Who?”, “What?” and “So what?” of fiduciary law, 
suggesting four questions which still bedevil this area: who is a fiduciary? 
What, if anything, does the fiduciary role add to the nature of the non-
fiduciary obligations owed by fiduciaries? Why is the disgorgement 
remedy proprietary? And what, if anything, does it mean by way 
of distinctive remedy to say the fiduciary must “account” or deliver 
“equitable compensation”?
In all of this I am making a claim for more (or even more) rigorous 
analysis of the fiduciary terrain and careful exposure of its detail. This 
is far more effectively achieved if we untangle the precise obligations in 
issue and their particular objectives or goals, and, further, if we describe 
these findings in a simple, common, legal language. This will enable 
important comparisons to be made across the common law landscape, 
and ensure significant analogies are not missed. Lord Millett’s assertion 
that “[e]quity is not a set of rules but a state of mind”120 is a typically 
beguiling turn of phrase, but more progress will be made by following 
Lord Reed’s claim that “[l]egal analysis is as important in equity as in the 
common law”.121
120. Millett, “The Common Lawyer”, supra note 5 at 193. 
121. Redler, supra note 4 at para 95. 
